A comparison of the wholesale model and the agency model in differentiated markets

Liang Lu

doi:10.1007/s11151-017-9583-y

A comparison of the wholesale model and the agency model in differentiated markets

Liang Lu

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

12 Citations (Scopus)

15 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

We compare the wholesale model and the agency model that characterise a vertical relation in a bilateral duopoly framework. Results suggest that the agency model may be regarded as an example of retailer power resale price maintenance and provide an economic view of why restraints of this kind should be evaluated under the rule of reason. While competition is more likely to be undercut under the agency model, relative to the wholesale model, the agency model benefits consumers by offering relatively lower retail prices and greater demand.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	151–172
Number of pages	22
Journal	Review of Industrial Organization
Volume	51
Issue number	2
Early online date	19 Jul 2017
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-017-9583-y
Publication status	Published - Sept 2017

Keywords

Agency model
Competition
Resale price maintenance
Retailer power
Vertical restraints

Access to Document

10.1007/s11151-017-9583-yLicence: CC BY

Published manuscript
This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
Final published version, 630 KBLicence: CC BY

http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11151-017-9583-yLicence: CC BY

Cite this

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