A Kuhn–Tucker model for behaviour in dictator games

Peter G. Moffatt; Graciela Zevallos

doi:10.1007/s40881-021-00110-y

A Kuhn–Tucker model for behaviour in dictator games

Peter G. Moffatt, Graciela Zevallos

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Abstract

We consider a dictator game experiment in which dictators perform a sequence of giving tasks and taking tasks. The data is used to estimate the parameters of a Stone-Geary utility function over own-payoff and other’s payoff. The econometric model incorporates zero observations (e.g. zero-giving or zero-taking) by applying the Kuhn-Tucker theorem and treating zeros as corner solutions in the dictator’s constrained optimisation problem. The method of maximum simulated likelihood (MSL) is used for estimation. We find that selfishness is significantly lower in taking tasks than in giving tasks, and we attribute this difference to the “cold prickle of taking”.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	226–243
Number of pages	18
Journal	Journal of the Economic Science Association-JESA
Volume	7
Early online date	3 Dec 2021
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s40881-021-00110-y
Publication status	Published - Dec 2021

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10.1007/s40881-021-00110-yLicence: CC BY

Published_VersionFinal published version, 1.26 MBLicence: CC BY

Cite this

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title = "A Kuhn–Tucker model for behaviour in dictator games",

abstract = "We consider a dictator game experiment in which dictators perform a sequence of giving tasks and taking tasks. The data is used to estimate the parameters of a Stone-Geary utility function over own-payoff and other{\textquoteright}s payoff. The econometric model incorporates zero observations (e.g. zero-giving or zero-taking) by applying the Kuhn-Tucker theorem and treating zeros as corner solutions in the dictator{\textquoteright}s constrained optimisation problem. The method of maximum simulated likelihood (MSL) is used for estimation. We find that selfishness is significantly lower in taking tasks than in giving tasks, and we attribute this difference to the “cold prickle of taking”.",

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AU - Zevallos, Graciela

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N2 - We consider a dictator game experiment in which dictators perform a sequence of giving tasks and taking tasks. The data is used to estimate the parameters of a Stone-Geary utility function over own-payoff and other’s payoff. The econometric model incorporates zero observations (e.g. zero-giving or zero-taking) by applying the Kuhn-Tucker theorem and treating zeros as corner solutions in the dictator’s constrained optimisation problem. The method of maximum simulated likelihood (MSL) is used for estimation. We find that selfishness is significantly lower in taking tasks than in giving tasks, and we attribute this difference to the “cold prickle of taking”.

AB - We consider a dictator game experiment in which dictators perform a sequence of giving tasks and taking tasks. The data is used to estimate the parameters of a Stone-Geary utility function over own-payoff and other’s payoff. The econometric model incorporates zero observations (e.g. zero-giving or zero-taking) by applying the Kuhn-Tucker theorem and treating zeros as corner solutions in the dictator’s constrained optimisation problem. The method of maximum simulated likelihood (MSL) is used for estimation. We find that selfishness is significantly lower in taking tasks than in giving tasks, and we attribute this difference to the “cold prickle of taking”.

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DO - 10.1007/s40881-021-00110-y

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