Projects per year
Abstract
We consider a multi-winner nested elimination contest in which losers are sequentially eliminated to attain the set of winners. This is a variant of a widely used mechanism introduced by Clark and Riis (1996) that allows one to select the winners sequentially. We show that the current mechanism becomes equivalent to the mechanism suggested by Berry (1993) in which the winners are chosen simultaneously.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 357-359 |
Number of pages | 3 |
Journal | Economics Letters |
Volume | 125 |
Issue number | 3 |
Early online date | 18 Oct 2014 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - Dec 2014 |
Keywords
- Contest
- Multiple winner
- Selection mechanism
Projects
- 1 Finished
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CCP Centre for Competition Policy Phase 2 (2009-14)
Hviid, M., Akman, P., Davies, S., Hargreaves-Heap, S., Harker, M., Kassim, H., Lyons, B., Stephan, A., Sugden, R., Waddams, C., Wadlow, C., Zizzo, D., Allen-Rogers, D., Allen-Rogers, D. & Allen-Rogers, D.
Economic and Social Research Council
1/09/09 → 30/11/14
Project: Research