A Partial Defence of Descriptive Evidentialism About Intuitions: A Reply to Molyneux

James Andow

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2 Citations (Scopus)
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Bernard Molyneux presents some new arguments against descriptive evidentialism about intuitions. Descriptive evidentialism is the thesis that philosophers use intuitions as evidence. Molyneux's arguments are that: (1) the propositions that intuition putatively supports are treated as having a degree and kind of certainty and justification that they could not have got from being intuited; (2) intuitions influence us in ways we cannot explain by supposing we treat them as evidence; and (3) certain strong intuitions that persuade us of their contents are treated as inadmissible in the context of justification. This article presents a partial defence of descriptive evidentialism against these new arguments.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)183-195
Number of pages13
Issue number1-2
Publication statusPublished - Jan 2017


  • intuitions
  • metaphilosophy
  • philosophical methodology
  • evidence
  • descriptive evidentialism
  • epistemology of philosophy
  • defence of intuitions

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