Abstract
Bernard Molyneux presents some new arguments against descriptive evidentialism about intuitions. Descriptive evidentialism is the thesis that philosophers use intuitions as evidence. Molyneux's arguments are that: (1) the propositions that intuition putatively supports are treated as having a degree and kind of certainty and justification that they could not have got from being intuited; (2) intuitions influence us in ways we cannot explain by supposing we treat them as evidence; and (3) certain strong intuitions that persuade us of their contents are treated as inadmissible in the context of justification. This article presents a partial defence of descriptive evidentialism against these new arguments.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 183-195 |
| Number of pages | 13 |
| Journal | Metaphilosophy |
| Volume | 48 |
| Issue number | 1-2 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - Jan 2017 |
Keywords
- intuitions
- metaphilosophy
- philosophical methodology
- evidence
- descriptive evidentialism
- epistemology of philosophy
- defence of intuitions