An auction market for journal articles

Jens Prüfer; David Zetland

doi:10.1007/s11127-009-9571-3

An auction market for journal articles

Jens Prüfer, David Zetland

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

7 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We recommend that an auction market replace the current system for submitting academic papers and show a strict Pareto-improvement in equilibrium. Besides the benefit of speed, this mechanism increases the average quality of articles and journals and rewards editors and referees for their effort. The "academic dollar" proceeds from papers sold at auction go to authors, editors and referees of cited articles. This nonpecuniary income indicates the academic impact of an article-facilitating decisions on tenure and promotion. This auction market does not require more work of editors.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	379-403
Number of pages	25
Journal	Public Choice
Volume	145
Issue number	3
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-009-9571-3
Publication status	Published - Dec 2010

Keywords

A11
Academic journals
Academic productivity
D02
D44
Market design

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An auction market for journal articles

Abstract

Keywords

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