An experimental investigation of Colonel Blotto games

Subhasish Modak Chowdhury, Dan Kovenock, Roman M. Sheremeta

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55 Citations (Scopus)
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This article examines behavior in the two-player, constant-sum Colonel Blotto game with asymmetric resources in which players maximize the expected number of battlefields won. The experimental results support the main qualitative predictions of the theory. In the auction treatment, where winning a battlefield is deterministic, disadvantaged players use a “guerilla warfare” strategy that stochastically allocates zero resources to a subset of battlefields. Advantaged players employ a “stochastic complete coverage” strategy, allocating random, but positive, resource levels across the battlefields. In the lottery treatment, where winning a battlefield is probabilistic, both players divide their resources equally across all battlefields. However, we also find interesting behavioral deviations from the theory and discuss their implications.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)833-861
Number of pages29
JournalEconomic Theory
Issue number3
Early online date20 Oct 2011
Publication statusPublished - Apr 2013

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