And the first runner-up is...: Comparing winner selection procedures in multi-winner Tullock contests

Subhasish M. Chowdhury, Anwesha Mukherjee, Theodore L. Turocy

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We characterise the strategic equivalence among k-winner contests using simultaneous and sequential winner selection. We test this prediction of strategic equivalence using a series of laboratory experiments, contrasting 1-winner contests with 2-winner contests, varying in the latter whether the outcome is revealed sequentially or in a single stage. We find that in the long run, average bidding levels are similar across strategically-equivalent contests. However, adaptation in 2-winner contests is slower and less systematic, which is consistent with the property that simultaneous winner selection results in outcomes that are more random than in the 1-winner case.
Original languageEnglish
JournalReview of Economic Design
Early online date9 Nov 2022
Publication statusE-pub ahead of print - 9 Nov 2022

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