Projects per year
Abstract
We characterize the Shapley value using (together with standard conditions of efficiency and equal gains in two-player games) a condition of ‘undominated merge-externalities’. Similar to the well-known ‘balanced contributions’ characterization, our characterization corresponds intuitively to ‘threat points’ present in bargaining. It derives from the observation that all semivalues satisfy ‘balanced merge-externalities’. Our characterization is applicable to useful, narrow sub-classes of games (including monotonic simple games), and also extends naturally to encompass games in partition function form.
Original language | English |
---|---|
Pages (from-to) | 81-92 |
Number of pages | 12 |
Journal | Games and Economic Behavior |
Volume | 108 |
Early online date | 28 Mar 2018 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 28 Mar 2018 |
Keywords
- Shapley value
- Balanced contributions
- Merge-externalities
- Semivalues
- Coalitional bargaining
Profiles
-
Ben Mcquillin
- School of Economics - Lecturer in Economics
- Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science - Member
- Behavioural Economics - Member
- Economic Theory - Member
Person: Research Group Member, Research Centre Member, Academic, Teaching & Research
-
Robert Sugden
- School of Economics - Professor of Economics
- Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science - Member
- Centre for Competition Policy - Member
- Behavioural Economics - Member
- Economic Theory - Member
Person: Research Group Member, Research Centre Member, Academic, Teaching & Research
Projects
- 1 Finished
-
Network for Intergrated Behavioural Science
Starmer, C., Turocy, T., Barr, A., Brown, G., Chater, N., Cubitt, R., Fatas, E., Gathergood, J., Gosling, S., Lomes, G., MacKay, R., Poulsen, A., Read, D., Stewart, N., Sugden, R. & Zizzo, D.
Economic and Social Research Council
31/12/12 → 30/12/16
Project: Research