Balanced externalities and the Shapley value

Ben McQuillin; Robert Sugden

doi:10.1016/j.geb.2018.03.006

Balanced externalities and the Shapley value

Ben McQuillin, Robert Sugden

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article

2 Citations (Scopus)

11 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

We characterize the Shapley value using (together with standard conditions of efficiency and equal gains in two-player games) a condition of ‘undominated merge-externalities’. Similar to the well-known ‘balanced contributions’ characterization, our characterization corresponds intuitively to ‘threat points’ present in bargaining. It derives from the observation that all semivalues satisfy ‘balanced merge-externalities’. Our characterization is applicable to useful, narrow sub-classes of games (including monotonic simple games), and also extends naturally to encompass games in partition function form.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	81-92
Number of pages	12
Journal	Games and Economic Behavior
Volume	108
Early online date	28 Mar 2018
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2018.03.006
Publication status	Published - 28 Mar 2018

Keywords

Shapley value
Balanced contributions
Merge-externalities
Semivalues
Coalitional bargaining

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10.1016/j.geb.2018.03.006

Accepted manuscriptAccepted author manuscript, 380 KBLicence: CC BY-NC-ND

Ben Mcquillin
- B.Mcquillin@uea.ac.uk
- School of Economics - Lecturer in Economics
- Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science - Member
- Behavioural Economics - Member
- Economic Theory - Member
Person: Research Group Member, Research Centre Member, Academic, Teaching & Research
Robert Sugden
- R.Sugden@uea.ac.uk
- School of Economics - Professor of Economics
- Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science - Member
- Centre for Competition Policy - Member
- Behavioural Economics - Member
- Economic Theory - Member
Person: Research Group Member, Research Centre Member, Academic, Teaching & Research

1 Finished

Network for Intergrated Behavioural Science
Starmer, C., Turocy, T., Barr, A., Brown, G., Chater, N., Cubitt, R., Fatas, E., Gathergood, J., Gosling, S., Hargreaves-Heap, S., Lomes, G., MacKay, R., Poulsen, A., Read, D., Stewart, N., Sugden, R. & Zizzo, D.
Economic and Social Research Council
31/12/12 → 30/12/16
Project: Research

Cite this

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title = "Balanced externalities and the Shapley value",

abstract = "We characterize the Shapley value using (together with standard conditions of efficiency and equal gains in two-player games) a condition of {\textquoteleft}undominated merge-externalities{\textquoteright}. Similar to the well-known {\textquoteleft}balanced contributions{\textquoteright} characterization, our characterization corresponds intuitively to {\textquoteleft}threat points{\textquoteright} present in bargaining. It derives from the observation that all semivalues satisfy {\textquoteleft}balanced merge-externalities{\textquoteright}. Our characterization is applicable to useful, narrow sub-classes of games (including monotonic simple games), and also extends naturally to encompass games in partition function form.",

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AB - We characterize the Shapley value using (together with standard conditions of efficiency and equal gains in two-player games) a condition of ‘undominated merge-externalities’. Similar to the well-known ‘balanced contributions’ characterization, our characterization corresponds intuitively to ‘threat points’ present in bargaining. It derives from the observation that all semivalues satisfy ‘balanced merge-externalities’. Our characterization is applicable to useful, narrow sub-classes of games (including monotonic simple games), and also extends naturally to encompass games in partition function form.

KW - Shapley value

KW - Balanced contributions

KW - Merge-externalities

KW - Semivalues

KW - Coalitional bargaining

U2 - 10.1016/j.geb.2018.03.006

DO - 10.1016/j.geb.2018.03.006

M3 - Article

VL - 108

SP - 81

EP - 92

JO - Games and Economic Behavior

JF - Games and Economic Behavior

SN - 0899-8256

ER -

Balanced externalities and the Shapley value

Abstract

Keywords

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Profiles

Ben Mcquillin

Robert Sugden

Projects

Network for Intergrated Behavioural Science

Cite this