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Balanced externalities and the Shapley value

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

3 Citations (Scopus)
51 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

We characterize the Shapley value using (together with standard conditions of efficiency and equal gains in two-player games) a condition of ‘undominated merge-externalities’. Similar to the well-known ‘balanced contributions’ characterization, our characterization corresponds intuitively to ‘threat points’ present in bargaining. It derives from the observation that all semivalues satisfy ‘balanced merge-externalities’. Our characterization is applicable to useful, narrow sub-classes of games (including monotonic simple games), and also extends naturally to encompass games in partition function form.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)81-92
Number of pages12
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Volume108
Early online date28 Mar 2018
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 28 Mar 2018

Keywords

  • Shapley value
  • Balanced contributions
  • Merge-externalities
  • Semivalues
  • Coalitional bargaining

Access to Document

    • Network for Intergrated Behavioural Science

      Starmer, C. (Principal Investigator), Turocy, T. (Principal Investigator), Barr, A. (Co-Investigator), Brown, G. (Co-Investigator), Chater, N. (Co-Investigator), Cubitt, R. (Co-Investigator), Fatas, E. (Co-Investigator), Gathergood, J. (Co-Investigator), Gosling, S. (Co-Investigator), Lomes, G. (Co-Investigator), MacKay, R. (Co-Investigator), Poulsen, A. (Co-Investigator), Read, D. (Co-Investigator), Stewart, N. (Co-Investigator), Sugden, R. (Co-Investigator) & Zizzo, D. (Co-Investigator)

      Economic and Social Research Council

      31/12/12 → 30/12/16

      Project: Research

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