Bilateral bargaining in networks

Arnold Polanski

doi:10.1016/j.jet.2006.01.006

Bilateral bargaining in networks

Arnold Polanski

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

28 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Each connected pair of nodes in a network can jointly produce one unit of surplus. A maximum number of linked nodes is selected in every period to bargain bilaterally over the division of the surplus, according to the protocol proposed by Rubinstein and Wollinsky [Equilibrium in a market with sequential bargaining, Econometrica 53 (1985) 1133–1150]. All pairs, which reach an agreement, obtain the (discounted) payoffs and are removed from the network. This bargaining game has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium that induces the Dulmage–Mendelsohn decomposition (partition) of the bipartite network (of the set of nodes in this network).

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	557-565
Number of pages	9
Journal	Journal of Economic Theory
Volume	134
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2006.01.006
Publication status	Published - 2007

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10.1016/j.jet.2006.01.006

Cite this

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