Bilateral delegation in wage and employment bargaining in monopoly

Bibhas Saha; Ishita Chatterjee

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2013.04.009

Bilateral delegation in wage and employment bargaining in monopoly

Bibhas Saha, Ishita Chatterjee

School of Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We study efficiency and distributional implications of bilateral delegation in wage and employment bargaining in monopoly. Delegation causes underproduction, and the bargaining pie severely contracts rendering mutual gains from delegation impossible. With an increase in the union’s bargaining power profit may perversely rise and the union’s utility may fall.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	280-283
Number of pages	4
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	120
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2013.04.009
Publication status	Published - Aug 2013

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10.1016/j.econlet.2013.04.009

Cite this

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title = "Bilateral delegation in wage and employment bargaining in monopoly",

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AB - We study efficiency and distributional implications of bilateral delegation in wage and employment bargaining in monopoly. Delegation causes underproduction, and the bargaining pie severely contracts rendering mutual gains from delegation impossible. With an increase in the union’s bargaining power profit may perversely rise and the union’s utility may fall.

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DO - 10.1016/j.econlet.2013.04.009

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JF - Economics Letters

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