Abstract
The combination of leniency programmes, high sanctions, complaints from customers and private actions for damages, has proven very successful at uncovering and punishing cartel agreements in United States Antitrust Law. Countless jurisdictions are being encouraged to adopt these ‘conventional’ enforcement tools, in the absence of an international competition authority. This paper identifies three issues which may undermine the universal efficacy of these cartel laws: (i) corruption and organized crime; (ii) social norms that are sympathetic to collusive practices; (iii) collectivist business cultures built on personal relationships.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 345-367 |
| Number of pages | 23 |
| Journal | Journal of Law and Society |
| Volume | 37 |
| Issue number | 2 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2010 |