Characterising competitive equilibrium in terms of opportunity

Robert Sugden

doi:10.1007/s00355-016-1015-7

Characterising competitive equilibrium in terms of opportunity

Robert Sugden

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

7 Citations (Scopus)

26 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

This paper analyses alternative profiles of opportunity sets for individuals in an exchange economy, without assuming that individuals’ choices reveal coherent preferences. It introduces the concept of a ‘market-clearing single-price regime’, representing a profile of opportunity sets consistent with competitive equilibrium. It also proposes an opportunity-based normative criterion, the Strong Opportunity Criterion, which is analogous with the core in preference-based analysis. It shows that every market-clearing single-price regime satisfies the Strong Opportunity Criterion and that, in the limit as an economy is replicated, only such regimes have this property.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	487–503
Number of pages	17
Journal	Social Choice and Welfare
Volume	48
Issue number	3
Early online date	9 Jan 2017
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-016-1015-7
Publication status	Published - Mar 2017

Keywords

opportunity criterion
competitive equilibrium
behavioural welfare economics

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10.1007/s00355-016-1015-7Licence: CC BY

Published manuscript
© The Author(s) 2016. This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
Final published version, 489 KB

Robert Sugden
- R.Sugdenuea.acuk
- School of Economics - Professor of Economics
- Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science - Member
- Centre for Competition Policy - Member
- Behavioural Economics - Member
- Economic Theory - Member
Person: Research Group Member, Research Centre Member, Academic, Teaching and Research

Reconstructing normative economics on a foundation of mutual advantage
Sugden, R. (Principal Investigator), Isoni, A. (Co-Investigator) & Zheng, J. (Research Fellow)
EU Horizon 2020
1/01/16 → 30/06/21
Project: Research

File
Network for Intergrated Behavioural Science
Starmer, C. (Principal Investigator), Turocy, T. (Principal Investigator), Barr, A. (Co-Investigator), Brown, G. (Co-Investigator), Chater, N. (Co-Investigator), Cubitt, R. (Co-Investigator), Fatas, E. (Co-Investigator), Gathergood, J. (Co-Investigator), Gosling, S. (Co-Investigator), Lomes, G. (Co-Investigator), MacKay, R. (Co-Investigator), Poulsen, A. (Co-Investigator), Read, D. (Co-Investigator), Stewart, N. (Co-Investigator), Sugden, R. (Co-Investigator) & Zizzo, D. (Co-Investigator)
Economic and Social Research Council
31/12/12 → 30/12/16
Project: Research

Cite this

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Characterising competitive equilibrium in terms of opportunity

Abstract

Keywords

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Profiles

Robert Sugden

Projects

Reconstructing normative economics on a foundation of mutual advantage

Network for Intergrated Behavioural Science

Cite this