Common reasoning in games: a Lewisian analysis of common knowledge of rationality

Robin Cubitt, Robert Sugden

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Abstract

We present a new class of models of players' reasoning in non-cooperative games, inspired by David Lewis's account of common knowledge. We argue that the models in this class formalise common knowledge of rationality in a way that is distinctive, in virtue of modelling steps of reasoning; and attractive, in virtue of being able to represent coherently common knowledge of any consistent standard of individual decision-theoretic rationality. We contrast our approach with that of Robert Aumann (1987), arguing that the former avoids and diagnoses certain paradoxes to which the latter may give rise when extended in particular ways.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)285-329
Number of pages45
JournalEconomics and Philosophy
Volume30
Issue number03
Early online date22 Sep 2014
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Nov 2014

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