Projects per year
Abstract
We present a new class of models of players' reasoning in non-cooperative games, inspired by David Lewis's account of common knowledge. We argue that the models in this class formalise common knowledge of rationality in a way that is distinctive, in virtue of modelling steps of reasoning; and attractive, in virtue of being able to represent coherently common knowledge of any consistent standard of individual decision-theoretic rationality. We contrast our approach with that of Robert Aumann (1987), arguing that the former avoids and diagnoses certain paradoxes to which the latter may give rise when extended in particular ways.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 285-329 |
| Number of pages | 45 |
| Journal | Economics and Philosophy |
| Volume | 30 |
| Issue number | 03 |
| Early online date | 22 Sep 2014 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - Nov 2014 |
Profiles
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Robert Sugden
- School of Economics - Professor of Economics
- Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science - Member
- Centre for Competition Policy - Member
- Behavioural Economics - Member
- Economic Theory - Member
Person: Research Group Member, Research Centre Member, Academic, Teaching & Research
Projects
- 1 Finished
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Network for Intergrated Behavioural Science
Starmer, C., Turocy, T., Barr, A., Brown, G., Chater, N., Cubitt, R., Fatas, E., Gathergood, J., Gosling, S., Hargreaves-Heap, S., Lomes, G., MacKay, R., Poulsen, A., Read, D., Stewart, N., Sugden, R. & Zizzo, D.
Economic and Social Research Council
31/12/12 → 30/12/16
Project: Research