Communication compatible voting rules

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4 Citations (Scopus)


We reassess the possibility of full information pooling in a Condorcet jury environment featuring heterogeneous and privately known preference types. We find that in general, with uncorrelated preference types, only very limited heterogeneity is compatible with full pooling. We provide a sufficient condition, based on a simple measure of preference misalignment, under which the set of voting rules compatible with full pooling is at most a singleton. As a caveat to any simplistic conclusions, we identify a case in which an increase in heterogeneity (i.e. polarization) systematically generates the possibility of full pooling. Increased jury size, in contrast, is shown to always render full pooling more difficult.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)479–507
Number of pages9
JournalTheory and Decision
Issue number4
Early online date2 Oct 2012
Publication statusPublished - Apr 2013


  • Committees
  • Communication
  • Strategic voting

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