Conditional cooperation in two public goods games: the weakest link and the VCM

Rachel Croson; Enrique Fatas; Tibor Neugebauer

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2004.10.007

Conditional cooperation in two public goods games: the weakest link and the VCM

Rachel Croson, Enrique Fatas, Tibor Neugebauer

School of Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

92 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Experimental and empirical evidence identifies social preferences and proposes competing models of such preferences. We find that participants match the contributions of others in the voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM). We also examine a game with different equilibria, the weakest link mechanism (WLM). Here, in contrast, participants match the minimum contribution of others.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	95-101
Number of pages	7
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	87
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2004.10.007
Publication status	Published - 2005

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10.1016/j.econlet.2004.10.007

Cite this

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title = "Conditional cooperation in two public goods games: the weakest link and the VCM",

abstract = "Experimental and empirical evidence identifies social preferences and proposes competing models of such preferences. We find that participants match the contributions of others in the voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM). We also examine a game with different equilibria, the weakest link mechanism (WLM). Here, in contrast, participants match the minimum contribution of others.",

author = "Rachel Croson and Enrique Fatas and Tibor Neugebauer",

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AU - Fatas, Enrique

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AB - Experimental and empirical evidence identifies social preferences and proposes competing models of such preferences. We find that participants match the contributions of others in the voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM). We also examine a game with different equilibria, the weakest link mechanism (WLM). Here, in contrast, participants match the minimum contribution of others.

U2 - 10.1016/j.econlet.2004.10.007

DO - 10.1016/j.econlet.2004.10.007

M3 - Article

VL - 87

SP - 95

EP - 101

JO - Economics Letters

JF - Economics Letters

SN - 0165-1765

IS - 1

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