Abstract
We generalize the classical binary Condorcet jury model by introducing a richer state and signal space, thereby generating a concern for consistency in the evaluation of aggregate information. We analyze truth-telling incentives in simultaneous pre-vote communication in heterogeneous committees and find that full pooling of information followed by sincere voting is compatible with a positive probability of ex post conflict in the committee.
Original language | English |
---|---|
Pages (from-to) | 24-35 |
Number of pages | 12 |
Journal | Journal of Economic Theory |
Volume | 160 |
Early online date | 29 Aug 2015 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - Dec 2015 |
Keywords
- Committees
- Voting
- Information aggregation
- Cheap talk
Profiles
-
Mark Le Quement
- School of Economics - Visitor
- Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science - Member
- Behavioural Economics - Member
- Economic Theory - Member
- Industrial Economics - Member
Person: Other related - academic, Research Group Member, Research Centre Member