Consistency and communication in committees

Inga Deimen; Felix Ketelaar; Mark T. Le Quement

doi:10.1016/j.jet.2015.08.004

Consistency and communication in committees

Inga Deimen, Felix Ketelaar, Mark T. Le Quement

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Abstract

We generalize the classical binary Condorcet jury model by introducing a richer state and signal space, thereby generating a concern for consistency in the evaluation of aggregate information. We analyze truth-telling incentives in simultaneous pre-vote communication in heterogeneous committees and find that full pooling of information followed by sincere voting is compatible with a positive probability of ex post conflict in the committee.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	24-35
Number of pages	12
Journal	Journal of Economic Theory
Volume	160
Early online date	29 Aug 2015
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.08.004
Publication status	Published - Dec 2015

Keywords

Committees
Voting
Information aggregation
Cheap talk

Access to Document

10.1016/j.jet.2015.08.004

Accepted manuscriptAccepted author manuscript, 344 KBLicence: CC BY-NC-ND

Cite this

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title = "Consistency and communication in committees",

abstract = "We generalize the classical binary Condorcet jury model by introducing a richer state and signal space, thereby generating a concern for consistency in the evaluation of aggregate information. We analyze truth-telling incentives in simultaneous pre-vote communication in heterogeneous committees and find that full pooling of information followed by sincere voting is compatible with a positive probability of ex post conflict in the committee.",

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AU - Le Quement, Mark T.

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AB - We generalize the classical binary Condorcet jury model by introducing a richer state and signal space, thereby generating a concern for consistency in the evaluation of aggregate information. We analyze truth-telling incentives in simultaneous pre-vote communication in heterogeneous committees and find that full pooling of information followed by sincere voting is compatible with a positive probability of ex post conflict in the committee.

KW - Committees

KW - Voting

KW - Information aggregation

KW - Cheap talk

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DO - 10.1016/j.jet.2015.08.004

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JF - Journal of Economic Theory

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