Cooperative Conflicts and Gender Relations: Experimental Evidence from Southeast Uganda

C. Jackson

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    This study analyzes research results from experimental games played in the predominantly Bagisu area of Uganda in 2005. The games were designed to understand how husbands and wives manage household funds in relation to Amartya Sen's model of cooperative conflicts, which is widely used as a heuristic device for understanding intrahousehold bargaining. This study questions Sen's emphasis on the lower self-perceptions of personal welfare among women and on the role of cash contributions to the household as the basis of bargaining power, and it argues for a broader characterization of breakdown positions.
    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)24-47
    JournalFeminist Economics
    Volume19
    Issue number4
    Early online date6 Sep 2013
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 1 Nov 2013

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