Abstract
Two alternative modes of reasoning in coordination games are prominently discussed in the literature: level-k thinking and team reasoning. In order to differentiate between the two modes of reasoning, we experimentally investigate payoff-asymmetric coordination games using an intra-group communication design that incentivizes subjects to explain the reasoning behind their decisions. We find that the reasoning process is significantly different between games. In payoff-symmetric games, team reasoning plays an important role for coordination. In payoff-asymmetric games, level-k reasoning results in frequent miscoordination. Our study clearly illustrates how small differences between strategic situations
have a strong influence on reasoning.
have a strong influence on reasoning.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 158-188 |
Number of pages | 31 |
Journal | Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization |
Volume | 169 |
Early online date | 30 Nov 2019 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - Jan 2020 |
Profiles
-
Stefan Penczynski
- School of Economics - Associate Professor in Economics
- Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science - Member
- Behavioural Economics - Member
Person: Research Group Member, Academic, Teaching & Research