Coordination in stag hunt games

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Abstract

Stag hunt games display a tension between a payoff superior option (stag) and a less risky but payoff inferior alternative (hare). We explore that tension by proposing a selection criterion (which we denote as relative salience) where subjects choose to coordinate in one option by comparing the salience of stag’s main aspect (its payoff) to the salience of hare’s main aspect (its risk) by accounting for both payoff-relevant factors and unobservable individual-specific (idiosyncratic) preferences. Using data from 10 experiments, we find that this criterion is a significant determinant of individual choices in stag-hunt games, outperforming other selection methods.
Original languageEnglish
Article number102290
JournalJournal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics
Volume113
Early online date14 Sep 2024
DOIs
Publication statusE-pub ahead of print - 14 Sep 2024

Keywords

  • equilibrium selection
  • coordination
  • relative salience
  • stag hunt game
  • risk dominance
  • payoff dominance

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