Abstract
One might expect that, in pure coordination games, coordination would become less frequent as the number of options increases. Contrary to this expectation, we report an experiment which found more frequent coordination when the option set was unrestricted than when it was restricted. To try to explain this result, we develop a method for eliciting the general rules that subjects use to identify salient options in restricted and unrestricted sets. We find that each such rule, if used by all subjects, would generate greater coordination in restricted sets. However, subjects tend to apply different rules to restricted and unrestricted sets.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 107–129 |
Number of pages | 23 |
Journal | Theory and Decision |
Volume | 83 |
Issue number | 1 |
Early online date | 7 Feb 2017 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - Jun 2017 |
Keywords
- coordination
- salience
- focal points
- odd-one-out
- typicality
- prototypicality
Profiles
-
Robert Sugden
- School of Economics - Professor of Economics
- Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science - Member
- Centre for Competition Policy - Member
- Behavioural Economics - Member
- Economic Theory - Member
Person: Research Group Member, Research Centre Member, Academic, Teaching & Research