Abstract
In a Hotelling model with a climate coalition and a free-riding fringe, we compare demand-side and supply-side climate policies aimed at keeping CO2 concentration below a ceiling equivalent to global warming of 2 ◦C. With the demand-side policy, the coalition caps its fuel demand. The corresponding allocation is intra-temporally distorted. With the supply-side policy, the coalition purchases deposits. The corresponding allocation is inter-temporally distorted and the fuel extraction path can be discontinuous. In an empirically calibrated economy, a medium-sized (the grand) coalition is stable with the demand-side (supply-side) policy. If the coalition acts strategically, the stable grand coalition implements first best.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 1371-1406 |
| Number of pages | 36 |
| Journal | The Economic Journal |
| Volume | 133 |
| Issue number | 652 |
| Early online date | 5 Jan 2023 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - May 2023 |