Abstract
Les institutions européennes et les personnes qui travaillent pour elles sont souvent considérées comme renfermées et peu réactives. Alors que la Commission européenne est dépeinte comme une technocratie distante, le Secrétariat du Conseil est considéré comme secret et introspectif. Cet article soumet ces hypothèses à un test empirique et va à leur encontre. S'appuyant sur deux jeux de données originaux, il cartographie les pratiques d'interaction avec les acteurs extérieurs pour ces deux parties de l'administration de l'UE. Il montre non seulement que la Commission européenne et le Secrétariat du Conseil sont en contact permanent avec des acteurs extérieurs, mais aussi que leurs préférences quant à la localisation de l'autorité décisionnelle au niveau de l'UE ou au niveau national sont affectées par ces contacts, quoique dans des mesures différentes.
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The EU institutions and the people who work for them are often considered remote and unresponsive. While the European Commission is depicted as a distant technocracy, the Council Secretariat is viewed as secretive and introspective. This paper puts these assumptions to the empirical test and finds against the accepted wisdoms. Drawing on two original datasets, it maps patterns of interaction with external actors for both parts of the EU administration. It shows not only that the European Commission and Council Secretariat are in constant contact with outside actors, but that their preferences about whether decision-making authority should be located at the EU or at national level are affected, even if the governance preferences of staff in the Council Secretariat are less influenced.
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The EU institutions and the people who work for them are often considered remote and unresponsive. While the European Commission is depicted as a distant technocracy, the Council Secretariat is viewed as secretive and introspective. This paper puts these assumptions to the empirical test and finds against the accepted wisdoms. Drawing on two original datasets, it maps patterns of interaction with external actors for both parts of the EU administration. It shows not only that the European Commission and Council Secretariat are in constant contact with outside actors, but that their preferences about whether decision-making authority should be located at the EU or at national level are affected, even if the governance preferences of staff in the Council Secretariat are less influenced.
Translated title of the contribution | "Porous" bureaucracies? Social influence and governance preferences in the European Commission and the Council Secretariat |
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Original language | French |
Pages (from-to) | 41-64 |
Number of pages | 24 |
Journal | Revue française d’administration publique |
Volume | 181 |
Issue number | 1 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 2022 |