Abstract
Experimental philosophy’s much-discussed ‘restrictionist’ program seeks to delineate the extent to which philosophers may legitimately rely on intuitions about possible cases. The present paper shows that this program can be (i) put to the service of diagnostic problem-resolution (in the wake of J.L. Austin) and (ii) pursued by constructing and experimentally testing psycholinguistic explanations of intuitions which expose their lack of evidentiary value: The paper develops a psycholinguistic explanation of paradoxical intuitions that are prompted by verbal case-descriptions, and presents two experiments that support the explanation. This debunking explanation helps resolve philosophical paradoxes about perception (known as ‘arguments from hallucination’).
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 117-137 |
Number of pages | 21 |
Journal | teorema |
Volume | 36 |
Issue number | 3 |
Publication status | Published - 22 Sept 2017 |
Profiles
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Paul Engelhardt
- School of Psychology - Associate Professor in Psychology
- UEA Experimental Philosophy Group - Member
Person: Research Group Member, Academic, Teaching & Research
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Eugen Fischer
- School of Politics, Philosophy and Area Studies - Professor of Experimental Philosophy
- UEA Experimental Philosophy Group - Member
- Philosophy - Member
- Wittgenstein - Member
Person: Research Group Member, Academic, Teaching & Research