Do non-philosophers think epistemic consequentialism is counterintuitive?

James Andow

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Abstract

Direct epistemic consequentialism is the idea that X is epistemically permissible iff X maximizes epistemic value. It has received lots of attention in recent years and is widely accepted by philosophers to have counterintuitive implications. There are various reasons one might suspect that the relevant intuitions will not be widely shared among non-philosophers. This paper presents an initial empirical study of ordinary intuitions. The results of two experiments demonstrate that the counterintuitiveness of epistemic consequentialism is more than a philosophers’ worry—the folk seem to agree!
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)2631-2643
Number of pages13
JournalSynthese
Volume194
Issue number7
Early online date12 Apr 2016
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jul 2017

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