Do people make strategic commitments? Experimental evidence on strategic information avoidance

Anders U. Poulsen, Michael W. M. Roos

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

13 Citations (Scopus)


Game theory predicts that players make strategic commitments that may appear counter-intuitive. We conducted an experiment to see if people make a counter-intuitive but strategically optimal decision to avoid information. The experiment is based on a sequential Nash demand game in which a responding player can commit ahead of the game not to see what a proposing player demanded. Our data show that subjects do, but only after substantial time, learn to make the optimal strategic commitment. We find only weak evidence of physical timing effects.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)206-225
Number of pages20
JournalExperimental Economics
Issue number2
Publication statusPublished - 2010

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