Abstract
We examine the effects of endogenous assignment to incentive contracts on worker productivity. Assignment to high performance pay via a market mechanism is roughly twice as effective as imposing the same contract exogenously. This positive effect is largely offset by a negative effect for workers that endogenously choose low performance pay. We decompose the positive effect of endogenous assignment to high performance pay into effects due to selection and strategic anticipation, and find that selection has a greater effect than strategic anticipation. We use a Reverse Sort treatment to show that the effect of selection is sufficiently strong to overcome the direct effect of lower performance pay, yielding coordination at high effort levels in spite of low incentives.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 78-97 |
Number of pages | 20 |
Journal | Games and Economic Behavior |
Volume | 112 |
Early online date | 15 Aug 2018 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - Nov 2018 |
Keywords
- Experiment
- coordination
- incentive contracts
- selection
Profiles
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David Cooper
- School of Economics - Professor of Economics
- Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science - Member
- Behavioural Economics - Member
Person: Research Group Member, Research Centre Member, Academic, Teaching & Research