Epistemic Consequentialism, Truth Fairies and Worse Fairies

James Andow

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

2 Citations (Scopus)
11 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

Direct Epistemic Consequentialism faces the Truth Fairy. Indirect Epistemic Consequentialism promises to avoid this issue. But there are worse fairies than the Truth Fairy. There is the Worse Fairy. The case of the Worse Fairy helps demonstrate that epistemic consequentialists who would solve problems like the Truth Fairy by ‘going indirect’ face a dilemma.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)987-993
Number of pages7
JournalPhilosophia
Volume45
Issue number3
Early online date12 Apr 2017
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Sep 2017

Keywords

  • Epistemic consequentialism
  • Rationality
  • Truth fairy
  • Worse fairy

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