Abstract
Formal independence of non-executive directors should not be used as a mask for a potential problem of self-interest, as it can occur in many forms. While laws regulate more severe forms of self-interest, little attention is given to subtle governance controls that can seek to align a non-executive’s interests with the company’s. The increased role non-executives have on a board of directors exacerbates this problem with little consideration or evidence to support improved governance. This article is an empirical analysis seeking to identify if self-interest is a problem for non-executive directors and whether there are any available governance controls or if regulation is required. It also endeavours to inform a larger empirical study that seeks to hone in on the problem of self-interest for non-executives. This article provides evidence that self-interest is a potential problem if left unchecked.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 287-298 |
Number of pages | 13 |
Journal | International Company and Commercial Law Review |
Volume | 27 |
Issue number | 9 |
Publication status | Published - 2016 |
Keywords
- Corporate Governance
- Directors
- Non-Executive
- Remuneration
- Agency