Abstract
Schelling's concept of a focal point is widely understood and used in game theory, but is often thought to lack adequate theoretical foundations; Schelling's own account is viewed as metaphorical and mysterious. We reconstruct that account and argue that it contains a sound theory of how rational players solve coordination problems. However, the philosophical framework which supports Schelling's theory is not a deductive system of the kind presupposed by classical game theory but a pragmatic one.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 609-621 |
| Number of pages | 13 |
| Journal | Journal of Economic Psychology |
| Volume | 27 |
| Issue number | 5 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 1 Oct 2006 |
Keywords
- Focal point
- Coordination game
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