Abstract
The principle that every individual on the planet has a claim to an equal share of Earth’s natural resources has an intuitive attraction. Yet the Principle of Natural Resource Equality is not without its problems. This article focuses on the problem of valuation. Unless and until its adherents are able to develop an adequate theoretical mechanism for determining the comparative value of two or more bundles of natural resources the principle lacks applicability and persuasive force. Three adequacy constraints on such a mechanism are presented and then applied to a theorisation of the Principle of Natural Resource Equality that I have already expounded elsewhere: Global Equality of Resources. In each case I try to argue that Global Equality of Resources could satisfy the adequacy constraint, provided that both this theory and the relevant constraint are properly understood.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 609-628 |
Number of pages | 20 |
Journal | Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy |
Volume | 19 |
Issue number | 5 |
Early online date | 19 May 2016 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 2016 |
Keywords
- global justice
- natural resources
- equality
- Ronald Dworkin
Profiles
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Alexander Brown
- School of Politics, Philosophy and Area Studies - Reader
- Policy & Politics - Member
- Politics & International Relations - Member
Person: Research Group Member, Academic, Teaching & Research