Group contests with internal conflict and power asymmetry

Jay Pil Choi, Subhasish M. Chowdhury, Jaesoo Kim

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29 Citations (Scopus)
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We investigate simultaneous inter- and intra-group conflict in the shadow of within-group power asymmetry and complementarity in members' group-conflict efforts. A more symmetric group faces a higher degree of internal conflict, and might expend more effort in external conflict when the group-conflict effort technology is highly complementary. Depending on the degree of complementarity, the stronger player's relative contribution to external conflict might be higher in a more asymmetric group and, as a result, it is possible for the weaker player to earn a higher payoff. In the absence of any complementarity, the rent-dissipation is non-monotonic with the within-group power asymmetry.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)816–840
Number of pages25
JournalThe Scandinavian Journal of Economics
Issue number4
Early online date22 Apr 2016
Publication statusPublished - Oct 2016


  • Asymmetry
  • collective action
  • conflict
  • group contest
  • C72
  • D72
  • D74
  • H41

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