Abstract
How does guilt affect participation in providing public goods? We characterise and analyse completely mixed symmetric equilibria (CMSE) in participation games where players are guilt averse. We find that relative to material preferences, guilt aversion can: facilitate the existence of CMSE; increase or decrease participation; and imply that group size has a non-monotonic effect on participation. Using our equilibrium characterisation we also re-analyse experimental data on participation games and find a low, but positive, guilt sensitivity parameter.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 279-295 |
| Number of pages | 17 |
| Journal | Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization |
| Volume | 167 |
| Early online date | 8 Jul 2018 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - Nov 2019 |
Keywords
- Participation
- Threshold public good
- Volunteer's dilemma
- Psychological Games
- Guilt aversion
Profiles
-
Amrish Patel
- School of Economics - Associate Professor in Economics
- Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science - Member
- Behavioural Economics - Member
- Economic Theory - Member
Person: Research Group Member, Academic, Teaching & Research