How delegation improves commitment

Grischa Perino

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2009.11.005

How delegation improves commitment

Grischa Perino

School of Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

11 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

McCallum (1995, American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings 85 (2), 207-211) conjectures that delegation merely relocates the commitment problem but does not solve it. This holds if optimal ex-ante policies do not change if additional information becomes available. However, with a flexibility-credibility trade-off delegation improves credibility.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	137-139
Number of pages	3
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	106
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2009.11.005
Publication status	Published - 2010

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10.1016/j.econlet.2009.11.005

Cite this

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title = "How delegation improves commitment",

abstract = "McCallum (1995, American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings 85 (2), 207-211) conjectures that delegation merely relocates the commitment problem but does not solve it. This holds if optimal ex-ante policies do not change if additional information becomes available. However, with a flexibility-credibility trade-off delegation improves credibility.",

author = "Grischa Perino",

year = "2010",

doi = "10.1016/j.econlet.2009.11.005",

language = "English",

volume = "106",

pages = "137--139",

journal = "Economics Letters",

publisher = "Elsevier",

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AB - McCallum (1995, American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings 85 (2), 207-211) conjectures that delegation merely relocates the commitment problem but does not solve it. This holds if optimal ex-ante policies do not change if additional information becomes available. However, with a flexibility-credibility trade-off delegation improves credibility.

U2 - 10.1016/j.econlet.2009.11.005

DO - 10.1016/j.econlet.2009.11.005

M3 - Article

VL - 106

SP - 137

EP - 139

JO - Economics Letters

JF - Economics Letters

IS - 2

ER -