How politicians make decisions under risk: a political choice experiment

Enrique Fatas; Tibor Neugebauer; Pilar Tamborero

doi:10.1007/s00712-007-0264-4

How politicians make decisions under risk: a political choice experiment

Enrique Fatas, Tibor Neugebauer, Pilar Tamborero

School of Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

30 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

The present paper reports on a political choice experiment with elected real-world politicians. A questionnaire on political and public issues is used to examine whether prospect theory predicts the responses of experts from the field better than rational choice theory. The results indicate that framing effects do not disappear with expertise.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	167-196
Number of pages	30
Journal	Journal of Economics
Volume	95
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-007-0264-4
Publication status	Published - 2007

Access to Document

10.1007/s00712-007-0264-4

Cite this

@article{fd4f5b4fbd6940f488e2f48b7ec329b5,

title = "How politicians make decisions under risk: a political choice experiment",

abstract = "The present paper reports on a political choice experiment with elected real-world politicians. A questionnaire on political and public issues is used to examine whether prospect theory predicts the responses of experts from the field better than rational choice theory. The results indicate that framing effects do not disappear with expertise.",

author = "Enrique Fatas and Tibor Neugebauer and Pilar Tamborero",

year = "2007",

doi = "10.1007/s00712-007-0264-4",

language = "English",

volume = "95",

pages = "167--196",

journal = "Journal of Economics",

issn = "0931-8658",

publisher = "Springer",

number = "2",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - How politicians make decisions under risk: a political choice experiment

AU - Fatas, Enrique

AU - Neugebauer, Tibor

AU - Tamborero, Pilar

PY - 2007

Y1 - 2007

N2 - The present paper reports on a political choice experiment with elected real-world politicians. A questionnaire on political and public issues is used to examine whether prospect theory predicts the responses of experts from the field better than rational choice theory. The results indicate that framing effects do not disappear with expertise.

AB - The present paper reports on a political choice experiment with elected real-world politicians. A questionnaire on political and public issues is used to examine whether prospect theory predicts the responses of experts from the field better than rational choice theory. The results indicate that framing effects do not disappear with expertise.

U2 - 10.1007/s00712-007-0264-4

DO - 10.1007/s00712-007-0264-4

M3 - Article

VL - 95

SP - 167

EP - 196

JO - Journal of Economics

JF - Journal of Economics

SN - 0931-8658

IS - 2

ER -