Incomplete punishment networks in public goods games: Experimental evidence

Andreas Leibbrandt (Lead Author), Abhijit Ramalingam, Lauri Sääksvuori, James M. Walker

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24 Citations (Scopus)
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Abundant evidence suggests that high levels of contributions to public goods can be sustained through self-governed monitoring and sanctioning. This experimental study investigates the effectiveness of decentralized sanctioning institutions in alternative punishment networks. Our results show that the structure of punishment network significantly affects allocations to the public good. In addition, we observe that network configurations are more important than punishment capacities for the levels of public good provision, imposed sanctions and economic efficiency. Lastly, we show that targeted revenge is a major driver of anti-social punishment.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)15-37
Number of pages23
JournalExperimental Economics
Issue number1
Early online date26 Apr 2014
Publication statusPublished - Mar 2015


  • public goods experiment
  • punishment
  • cooperation
  • networks

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