Inducing stability in hedonic games

Dinko Dimitrov, Emiliya A. Lazarova, Shao-Chin Sung

Research output: Working paper

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In many applications of coalition formation games, a key issue is that some desirable coalition structures are not elements of the core of these games. In these cases, it would be useful for an authority which aims to implement a certain outcome to know how far from the original game is the nearest game where the desirable outcome is part of the core. This question is at the center of this study. Focusing on hedonic games, we uncover previously unexplored links between such games and transferrable utility games, and develop a tailor-made solution concept for the transferrable utility game, the implementation core, to provide an answer to our question.
Original languageEnglish
PublisherUniversity of East Anglia
Publication statusPublished - Sep 2016

Publication series

NameSchool of Economics Working Paper
PublisherUniversity of East Anglia


  • hedonic game
  • implementation core
  • Kemeny distance
  • stability

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