Information and Endogenous First Mover Advantages in the Ultimatum Game

Anders U. Poulsen

doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2005.05.013

Information and Endogenous First Mover Advantages in the Ultimatum Game

Anders U. Poulsen

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

7 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We endogenize the first mover advantage in an evolutionary analysis of an ultimatum game where Responders are characterized by acceptance thresholds and Proposers by decision rules for how to condition offers on any available information about thresholds. The higher is the probability of receiving correct information about thresholds, and the lower its price, the larger is the share of the surplus that Responders obtain. While reliable and cheap information about Responders’ thresholds is desirable to an individual Proposer, in the long run it hurts Proposers as a group.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	129-143
Number of pages	15
Journal	Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
Volume	64
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2005.05.013
Publication status	Published - 2007

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10.1016/j.jebo.2005.05.013

Cite this

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