Information and endogenous first mover advantages in the ultimatum game

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We endogenize the first mover advantage in an evolutionary analysis of an ultimatum game where Responders are characterized by acceptance thresholds and Proposers by decision rules for how to condition offers on any available information about thresholds. The higher is the probability of receiving correct information about thresholds, and the lower its price, the larger is the share of the surplus that Responders obtain. While reliable and cheap information about Responders’ thresholds is desirable to an individual Proposer, in the long run it hurts Proposers as a group.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)129-143
Number of pages15
JournalJournal of Economic Behavior and Organization
Issue number1
Publication statusPublished - 2007

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