International Environmental Agreements and Black Technology

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Abstract

This paper analyzes the stability of international environmental agreements in a dynamic game when the generation of both renewables and fossil fuel based energy requires specialized capital stocks or technologies, respectively. Two contract types are considered. At an incomplete (a complete) contract, the coalition coordinates only (both) CO2 emissions (and renewable energy investments) of its members. In contrast to the results of Battaglini and Harstad (J Polit Econ 124:160–204, 2016) who endorse incomplete contracts to increase the coalition size, only small coalitions are stable regardless of whether the contract is complete or incomplete. This result also holds if black technology is temporary not completely used or transfers are considered.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)601-624
Number of pages24
JournalEnvironmental and Resource Economics
Volume82
Issue number3
Early online date31 Mar 2022
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jul 2022

Keywords

  • Black capacity
  • Complete contract
  • Incomplete contract
  • International environmental agreements

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