Abstract
The word ‘intuition’ is used frequently both in philosophy and in discussions about philosophical methods. It has been argued that this intuition-talk makes no (clear) semantic contribution and that intuition-talk is thus a bad habit that ought to be abandoned. I urge caution in making this inference. There are many pragmatic roles intuition-talk might play. Moreover, according to one plausible story (for which there is some empirical support), there is reason to think intuition-talk is actually a good habit for philosophers to have.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 523-531 |
| Number of pages | 9 |
| Journal | Philosophia |
| Volume | 45 |
| Issue number | 2 |
| Early online date | 22 Jan 2017 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - Jun 2017 |
Keywords
- Philosophical methods
- Intuition
- Hedging
- Metaphilosophy
- Epistemic humility
- Intellectual humility