Judgment aggregation in search for the truth

İrem Bozbay, Franz Dietrich, Hans Peters

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

10 Citations (Scopus)
2 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

We analyze the problem of aggregating judgments over multiple issues from the perspective of whether aggregate judgments manage to efficiently use all voters' private information. While new in judgment aggregation theory, this perspective is familiar in a different body of literature about voting between two alternatives where voters' disagreements stem from conflicts of information rather than of interest. Combining the two bodies of literature, we consider a simple judgment aggregation problem and model the private information underlying voters' judgments. Assuming that voters share a preference for true collective judgments, we analyze the resulting strategic incentives and determine which voting rules efficiently use all private information. We find that in certain, but not all cases a quota rule should be used, which decides on each issue according to whether the proportion of ‘yes’ votes exceeds a particular quota.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)571-590
Number of pages20
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Volume87
Early online date26 Feb 2014
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Sep 2014

Keywords

  • Judgment aggregation
  • Private information
  • Efficient information aggregation
  • Strategic voting

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