Lay intuitions about epistemic normativity

Pendaran Roberts (Lead Author), James Andow, Kelly Ann Schmidtke

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Recent empirical work on non-philosophers’ intuitions about epistemic normativity reveals patterns that cannot be fully accounted for by direct epistemic consequentialism. On the basis of these results, one might picture participants as “epistemic deontologists.” We present the results of two new experiments that support a more nuanced picture. We examine intuitions about guesses and hypotheses, and about beliefs. Our results suggest a two-factor model of intuitions, wherein both consequentialist and non-consequentialist considerations affect participants’ judgments about epistemic permissibility.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)3267–3287
Issue number7
Early online date29 Mar 2017
Publication statusPublished - Jul 2018

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