Lay intuitions about epistemic normativity

Pendaran Roberts; James Andow; Kelly Ann Schmidtke

doi:10.1007/s11229-017-1371-6

Lay intuitions about epistemic normativity

Pendaran Roberts (Lead Author), James Andow, Kelly Ann Schmidtke

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Abstract

Recent empirical work on non-philosophers’ intuitions about epistemic normativity reveals patterns that cannot be fully accounted for by direct epistemic consequentialism. On the basis of these results, one might picture participants as “epistemic deontologists.” We present the results of two new experiments that support a more nuanced picture. We examine intuitions about guesses and hypotheses, and about beliefs. Our results suggest a two-factor model of intuitions, wherein both consequentialist and non-consequentialist considerations affect participants’ judgments about epistemic permissibility.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	3267–3287
Journal	Synthese
Volume	195
Issue number	7
Early online date	29 Mar 2017
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-017-1371-6
Publication status	Published - Jul 2018

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10.1007/s11229-017-1371-6Licence: CC BY

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Cite this

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title = "Lay intuitions about epistemic normativity",

abstract = "Recent empirical work on non-philosophers{\textquoteright} intuitions about epistemic normativity reveals patterns that cannot be fully accounted for by direct epistemic consequentialism. On the basis of these results, one might picture participants as “epistemic deontologists.” We present the results of two new experiments that support a more nuanced picture. We examine intuitions about guesses and hypotheses, and about beliefs. Our results suggest a two-factor model of intuitions, wherein both consequentialist and non-consequentialist considerations affect participants{\textquoteright} judgments about epistemic permissibility.",

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