Abstract
In the winter of 1941, the Red Army faced a shell crisis brought on by the loss of its pre-war stocks due to the rapidity of the German advance that summer, the dislocation of industry due to evacuation to the Urals, and the large expansion in the size of the army. Materiel shortages during the battle for Moscow forced reform in both the approach to and administration of handling all manner of supplies. This saw the introduction of strict rationing of munitions supplies at the Front level, and the centralization of munitions distribution and stocks by the Rear in the Centre Bases of the NKO.1
1NKO refers to both to the department, the People’s Commissariat of Defense, and the office of the Commissar of Defense, held for most of the war by Jospeh Stalin. This use of a centralized supply system allowed the Red Army to use a ‘just in time’ approach to supplying the Fronts that enabled it to make maximum use of a limited number of supplies and to maintain a high tempo of operations.
Original language | English |
---|---|
Pages (from-to) | 53-79 |
Number of pages | 27 |
Journal | Journal of Slavic Military Studies |
Volume | 37 |
Issue number | 1 |
Early online date | 24 May 2024 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - Jul 2024 |
Keywords
- Logistics
- Railways
- Red Army
- Second World War
- Supply
- the Centre
- Transport