Abstract
The body of work on mathematical models of measurement known as ‘measurement theory’ is not yet adequately understood from a philosophical standpoint. Recent evaluations of measurement theory (in this paper I focus on Heilmann (Philosophy of Science 82:787–797, 2015); Philippi (Philosophy of Science 88:929-939, 2021); Tal (Perspectives on Science 29:701–741, 2021)) have dislocated it from the context of scientific enquiry, making it harder to appreciate its motivations and connection with experimental and theoretical work. This paper seeks to clarify what measurement theory is and does, offering a mathematically more nuanced account of its results than currently available in the philosophical literature.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Article number | 32 |
| Journal | Synthese |
| Volume | 206 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 1 Jul 2025 |
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