Merger remedies in the era of the Digital Markets Act (DMA): The impact of the DMA on the EU Merger Control Regulation (EUMR) in designing commitments

The Digital Markets Act (DMA) and the EU Merger Control Regulation (EUMR) are complementary tools that could apply concurrently to mergers involving gatekeepers. Yet, potential tensions between the DMA and the EUMR have been unexplored. It is this paper's objective to shed light on the interplay between the EUMR and the DMA, in the context of commitments design for gatekeeper acquisitions. This paper argues that the DMA could influence the EUMR in designing remedies, since these tools may be taking a similar approach to addressing the harmful effects of gatekeepers’ practices. Accordingly, the new DMA obligations could impact future commitments design under the EUMR in two ways. First, at the theory of harm stage, because of the DMA's deterrent effect. Second, at the remedy design stage, because of the principle of proportionality. Therefore, the DMA could restrict the EUMR's power to design merger commitments, in the context of gatekeeper acquisitions.