Abstract
Conceptual metaphors facilitate both productive and pernicious analogical reasoning. This paper addresses the question: When and why does the frequently helpful use of metaphor become pernicious? By applying the most influential theoretical framework from cognitive psychology (structure-mapping theory) in analysing the philosophically most prominent example of pernicious metaphorical reasoning (the early modern transformation of ‘the mind’), we identify a philosophically relevant but previously undescribed fallacy in analogical reasoning with metaphors. We then outline an explanation of why even competent thinkers commit this fallacy and obtain a psychologically informed ‘debunking’ explanation of the kind experimental philosophy’s ‘sources project’ seeks.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 67-77 |
Number of pages | 11 |
Journal | Analysis |
Volume | 75 |
Issue number | 1 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 1 Jan 2015 |
Keywords
- analogical inference
- conceptual metaphor
- mind metaphors
- automatic inference
- psychology of judgment and reasoning
- debunking explanations
Profiles
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Eugen Fischer
- School of Politics, Philosophy and Area Studies - Professor of Experimental Philosophy
- UEA Experimental Philosophy Group - Member
- Philosophy - Member
- Wittgenstein - Member
Person: Research Group Member, Academic, Teaching & Research