Mixed ownership in a mixed duopoly with differentiated products

Bibhas Saha

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23 Citations (Scopus)


We determine optimal privatization in a symmetric differentiated duopoly when the public firms do not bear the full cost of production and hence their objective functions differ from the government’s objective function. In the social optimum firms will generally have mixed ownership, and it will depend on the type of uncovered cost, the degree of substitutability of the two products and the output decision rule of the partially public firms. Different types of mixed duopoly emerge, ranging from both firms being partially privatized, to one being fully privatized. We also derive an optimal tax-subsidy scheme as a substitute for privatization.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)25-43
Number of pages19
JournalJournal of Economics
Issue number1
Publication statusPublished - 2009

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