Model consistent beliefs with information transmission in oligopoly

Morten Hviid

doi:10.1016/0176-2680(92)90023-A

Model consistent beliefs with information transmission in oligopoly

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article

Abstract

A model of market coordination in the presence of private information is developed. One component is a period of talk about output levels. The talk ends when no firm wishes to change its latest announced planned output level, and only if all firms enact their latest announced plans will such talk be repeated in future periods. It is shown how the degree of coordination and apparent collusion achieved is related to the noise in signalling market information.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	231-249
Number of pages	19
Journal	European Journal of Political Economy
Volume	8
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/0176-2680(92)90023-A
Publication status	Published - May 1992

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10.1016/0176-2680(92)90023-A

Cite this

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title = "Model consistent beliefs with information transmission in oligopoly",

abstract = "A model of market coordination in the presence of private information is developed. One component is a period of talk about output levels. The talk ends when no firm wishes to change its latest announced planned output level, and only if all firms enact their latest announced plans will such talk be repeated in future periods. It is shown how the degree of coordination and apparent collusion achieved is related to the noise in signalling market information.",

author = "Morten Hviid",

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AB - A model of market coordination in the presence of private information is developed. One component is a period of talk about output levels. The talk ends when no firm wishes to change its latest announced planned output level, and only if all firms enact their latest announced plans will such talk be repeated in future periods. It is shown how the degree of coordination and apparent collusion achieved is related to the noise in signalling market information.

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DO - 10.1016/0176-2680(92)90023-A

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