TY - JOUR
T1 - Nash versus Kant: A game-theoretic analysis of childhood vaccination behavior
AU - De Donder, Philippe
AU - Llavador, Humberto
AU - Penczynski, Stefan P.
AU - Roemer, John E.
AU - Vélez-Grajales, Roberto
N1 - Funding information: Philippe De Donder acknowledges the French ANR under grant ANR-17-EURE-0010 (EUR CHESS) for financial support. Humberto Llavador acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Agencia Estatal de Investigación (AEI), through the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (Barcelona School of Economics CEX2019-000915-S) and the grants PID2023-153318NB-I00 and PID2022-138443NB-I00. John Roemer acknowledges the Institute for Social and Policy Studies at Yale University for financial support. Open Access funding provided thanks to the CRUE-CSIC agreement with Springer Nature.
PY - 2025/7
Y1 - 2025/7
N2 - The vaccination game exhibits positive externalities. The standard game-theoretic approach assumes that parents make decisions according to the Nash protocol, which is individualistic and non-cooperative. However, in more solidaristic societies, parents may behave cooperatively, optimizing according to the Kantian protocol, in which the equilibrium is efficient. We develop a random utility model of vaccination behavior and prove that the equilibrium coverage rate is larger with the Kant protocol than with the Nash one. Using survey data collected from six countries, we calibrate the parameters of the vaccination game, compute both Nash equilibrium and Kantian equilibrium profiles, and compare them with observed vaccination behavior. We find evidence that parents demonstrate cooperative behavior in all six countries. The study highlights the importance of cooperation in shaping vaccination behavior and underscores the need to consider these factors in public health interventions.
AB - The vaccination game exhibits positive externalities. The standard game-theoretic approach assumes that parents make decisions according to the Nash protocol, which is individualistic and non-cooperative. However, in more solidaristic societies, parents may behave cooperatively, optimizing according to the Kantian protocol, in which the equilibrium is efficient. We develop a random utility model of vaccination behavior and prove that the equilibrium coverage rate is larger with the Kant protocol than with the Nash one. Using survey data collected from six countries, we calibrate the parameters of the vaccination game, compute both Nash equilibrium and Kantian equilibrium profiles, and compare them with observed vaccination behavior. We find evidence that parents demonstrate cooperative behavior in all six countries. The study highlights the importance of cooperation in shaping vaccination behavior and underscores the need to consider these factors in public health interventions.
KW - Free-rider problem
KW - Kantian equilibrium
KW - Measles vaccination
KW - Nash equilibrium
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/105002764474
U2 - 10.1007/s00712-025-00898-x
DO - 10.1007/s00712-025-00898-x
M3 - Article
SN - 0931-8658
VL - 145
SP - 97
EP - 128
JO - Journal of Economics
JF - Journal of Economics
IS - 2
ER -
SDG 3 Good Health and Well-being